This paper gives experimental evidence against the claim that speakers’ intuitions support semantic relativism about assertions of epistemic modal sentences and uses this evidence as part of a broader argument against assessment relativism. It follows other papers that reach similar conclusions, such as that of Knobe and Yalcin (Semant Pragmat 7:1–21, 2014). Its results were achieved simultaneously and independently of the more recent work of Kneer (Perspectives on taste. Aesthetics, language, metaphysics, and experimental philosophy. Routledge, 2022). The experimental data in (...) this paper supports two claims. The first is that, as Knobe and Yalcin (Semant Pragmat 7:1–21, 2014) also found, speakers diverge in their judgments about the truth-values and about the appropriate retraction of epistemic modal claims. The second is that speakers diverge in their judgments about when a retraction is appropriate and when it is required. This divergence was not tested by Knobe and Yalcin (Semant Pragmat 7:1–21, 2014) but aligns with the results independently reached by Kneer ((Kneer, Synthese 199(3–4): 6455–6471; Perspectives on taste. Aesthetics, language, metaphysics, and experimental philosophy. Routledge, 2022), and supports the arguments previously developed by Marques (Synthese 199(3–4): 6455–6471). The present studies tested the intuitions of both North American English speakers and of peninsular Spanish speakers, whose judgements on the topic had never been tested. The broader argument involves the relation between required retractions and falsity. (shrink)

This paper argues for contextualism about predicates of personal taste and evaluative predicates in general, and offers a proposal of how apparently resilient disagreements are to be explained. The present proposal is complementary to others that have been made in the recent literature. Several authors, for instance (López de Sa, 2008; Sundell, 2011; Huvenes, 2012; Marques and García-Carpintero, 2014; Marques, 2014a), have recently defended semantic contextualism for those kinds of predicates from the accusation that it faces the problem (...) of lost disagreement. These authors have proposed that a proper account of the resilient disagreement in the cases studied is to be achieved by an appeal to pragmatic processes, and to conflicting non-doxastic attitudes. It is argued here that the existing contextualist solutions are incomplete as they stand, and are subject to objections because of this. A supplementation of contextualism is offered, together with an explanation of why failed presuppositions of commonality (López de Sa), disputes over the appropriateness of a contextually salient standard (Sundell), and differences in non-doxastic attitudes (Sundell, Huvenes, Marques, and García-Carpintero) give rise to conflicts. This paper claims that conflicts of attitudes are the reason why people still have impressions of disagreement in spite of failed commonality presuppositions, that those conflicts drive metalinguistic disputes over the selection of appropriate standards, and hence conflicting non-doxastic attitudes demand an explanation that is independent of those context dependent pragmatic processes. The paper further argues that the missing explanation is 2-fold: first, disagreement prevails where the properties expressed by taste and value predicates are response-dependent properties, and, secondly, it prevails where those response-dependent properties are involved in evolved systems of coordination that respond to evolutionarily recurrent situations. (shrink)

John MacFarlane defends a radical form of truth relativism that makes the truth of assertions relative not only to contexts of utterance but also to contexts of assessment, or perspectives. Making sense of assessment-sensitive truth is a matter of making sense of the normative commitments undertaken by speakers in using assessment sensitive sentences. This paper argues against the possibility of making sense of such a practice. Evans raised a challenge to the coherence of relative truth. A modification of the challenge (...) can be given against MacFarlane’s revised views on assertion. The main objection to the relativist is that rational and earnest speakers are not bound by assessment-relative standards of correctness. (shrink)

Words change meaning, usually in unpredictable ways. But some words’ meanings are revised intentionally. Revisionary projects are normally put forward in the service of some purpose – some serve specific goals of inquiry, and others serve ethical, political or social aims. Revisionist projects can ameliorate meanings, but they can also pervert. In this paper, I want to draw attention to the dangers of meaning perversions, and argue that the self-declared goodness of a revisionist project doesn’t suffice to avoid meaning perversions. (...) The road to Hell, or to horrors on Earth, is paved with good intentions. Finally and more importantly, I want to demarcate what meaning perversions are. This, I hope, can help us assess the moral and political legitimacy of revisionary projects. (shrink)

Philosophers of language and metaethicists are concerned with persistent normative and evaluative disagreements – how can we explain persistent intelligible disagreements in spite of agreement over the described facts? Tim Sundell recently argued that evaluative aesthetic and personal taste disputes could be explained as metalinguistic negotiations – conversations where interlocutors negotiate how best to use a word relative to a context. I argue here that metalinguistic negotiations are neither necessary nor sufficient for genuine evaluative and normative disputes to occur. A (...) comprehensive account of value talk requires stronger metanormative commitments than metalinguistic negotiations afford. (shrink)

Kaplan (1999) argued that a different dimension of expressive meaning (“use-conditional”, as opposed to truth-conditional) is required to characterize the meaning of pejoratives, including slurs and racial epithets. Elaborating on this, writers have argued that the expressive meaning of pejoratives and slurs is either a conventional implicature (Potts 2007) or a presupposition (Macià 2002 and 2014, Schlenker 2007, Cepollaro and Stojanovic 2016). We argue that an expressive presuppositional theory accounts well for the data, but that expressive presuppositions are not just (...) propositions to be added to a common ground. We hold that expressives, including pejoratives and slurs, make requirements on a contextual record governed by sui generis norms specific to affective attitudes and their expressions. (shrink)

Este estudo tem por objetivo principal abordar a segunda definição de belo (καλός) oferecida pelo sofista Hípias de Élis no diálogo Hípias Maior de Platão. Após o fracasso da primeira tentativa, de que o belo seria uma bela donzela (Hp. mai. 287e), Sócrates introduz um novo elemento à investigação: a ideia de que é preciso descobrir a forma (εἶδος) que, quando acrescentada (προσγένηται), fará com que um ser surja (φαίνεται) belo (Hp. mai. 289d). Diante dessa nova compreensão, Hípias desenvolve a (...) tese de que o belo é na verdade o ouro (χρυσός), pois o ouro, ao ser acrescido a um objeto, é capaz de torná-lo belo e valioso. A fim de melhor esclarecer essa hipótese, o presente estudo divide-se em um comentário de duas partes: uma primeira, em que se aborda a tese áurica do sofista, suas peculiaridades, motivações e dificuldades preliminares e uma segunda, em que se discute a refutação da tese de Hípias e o problema do conveniente (πρέπων), levantado por Sócrates, tendo como exemplo a escultura de Fídias. -/- Palavras-chave: Platão; beleza; ouro; Hípias de Élis; eidos. (shrink)

Aspásia de Mileto (470?-400?) é uma figura cuja história nos é nebulosa e ao mesmo tempo muito clara. Nebulosa pois, como sugere Marta Andrade (2022, p. 24), trata-se de uma existência, como muitas outras, cuja memória a posteridade raramente se ocupou ou simplesmente esqueceu. Mas também clara pois Aspásia possui uma persona constituída no que chamamos de "tradição". A amante de Péricles. A professora de Sócrates. A esposa de Lísicles. Sua figura é frequentemente resgatada à sombra das figuras masculinas com (...) as quais se envolveu. Em grande medida porque as fontes que a resgatam trazem seu nome à margem, mas também em parte devido a uma postura metodológica que, por vezes, ignora nomes de mulheres. Neste artigo, viso recorrer às fontes para trazer à tona o protagonismo de Aspásia no que tange à educação e seu pioneirismo no pensamento retórico. Na primeira seção, desenvolverei uma breve biografia de Aspásia, sua possível influência política e suas habilidades pedagógicas. Na segunda seção, tratarei especialmente de suas contribuições para a retórica, abordando o discurso atribuído a si no Menêxeno de Platão e a Oração Fúnebre atribuída a Péricles por Tucídides. Por fim, na conclusão, diante das teses desenvolvidas, chegaremos a uma imagem mais digna de Aspásia, vislumbrando o retrato de uma mulher que dirige um elogio à coragem e cuja opinião incide diretamente em seu corpo social e político. Desse modo, compreenderemos melhor seus avanços nos âmbitos pedagógicos e retóricos, tidos como cruciais para o desenvolvimento dos cidadãos gregos. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem como objetivo principal esclarecer a concepção da tradição megárica acerca do conceito de capacidade (δύναμις), tal como apresentada no livro Theta da Metafísica de Aristóteles. A análise se faz necessária devido à falta de atenção aristotélica na formulação da tese adversária dos megáricos, pois em nenhum momento Aristóteles parece nos oferecer argumentos plausíveis que justifiquem de maneira adequada a tese de seus oponentes. Partindo desta dificuldade de reconstrução do argumento megárico e visando lhe oferecer uma maior (...) dignidade, o estudo irá, em primeiro lugar, destrinchar possíveis argumentos que sustentem a tese no contexto da referida obra. Em seguida, irá provar que, mesmo a tese megárica não sendo tão facilmente refutável como uma primeira leitura poderia sugerir, há em sua estrutura problemas graves, que se evidenciam diante da concepção aristotélica da capacidade. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that hate speech expresses hate, and answer some objections to expressivist views. First, I briefly comment on some limitations of pragmatic accounts of harmful speech. I then present an expressive-normative view of derogatory discourse according to which it is expressive of an affective state by presupposing it. A linguistic act expressive of an affective state inherits the normativity that is constitutive of that state, as directed to its intentional object. If the act is successful, it (...) updates the conversational context with the normative appraisal conditions of the affective state presupposed. I argue that this model can be applied to hate speech. I rely on current research on the psychology of hate to identify the appraisal conditions, action tendencies, and motivational goals characteristic of hate. The account supplements other pragmatic accounts of hate speech. (shrink)

In his Lectures on Fine Art (1835), Hegel emphasizes the grotesque character of Indian art. Grotesqueness results, in his view, from a contradiction between meaning and shape due to the incongruous combination of spiritual and material elements. Since Hegel's history of art is teeming with examples of inadequacy between meaning and shape, this paper aims to distinguish the grotesque from other types of artistic dissonance and to problematize Hegel's ascriptions of grotesqueness to ancient Indian art. In the first part of (...) the paper, I characterize the grotesque by the unnatural distortion of natural shapes with the purpose of achieving a direct sensuous manifestation of an indeterminate and impersonal divinity, Brahman. Such an attempt is, in Hegel's view, self-contradictory and self-defeating, leading to an exaggeration of the conflict between nature and spirit instead of the intended reconciliation between the two parts. In the second part of the paper, I compare Hegel's account of Indian art to the ‘monstrous myths’ of early modern Europe. Unlike his predecessors, Hegel legitimizes the grotesque representations of Hindu gods as endowed with profound meaning and the result of a universal human need, yet he describes them as ultimately irrational and repulsive based on a prejudiced view of the Indian people(s). In this sense, Hegel's assessment of Indian art functions as a reflection of modern European culture, its fascination and horror in the face of what Enlightenment could not entirely purge, rather than as a truthful and objective account of Indian art and culture. By questioning Hegel's characterization of Hindu iconography and mythology, this paper contributes to underexplored areas of Hegelian aesthetics, namely Hegel's account of symbolic art, especially Indian art, as well as his views on negative aesthetic experiences and values. (shrink)

O objetivo deste estudo é propor um modelo explicativo ao problema da beleza desenvolvido no diálogo Hípias Maior de Platão. É um lugar-comum entre os estudiosos defender o senso aporético do diálogo, ressaltando como todas as hipóteses formuladas são descartadas pelos interlocutores, tese que é geralmente endossada pela afirmação final de que as coisas belas são difíceis (304e8). No entanto, no epicentro deste emaranhado de hipóteses, algumas conclusões importantes surgem e serão, conforme se espera demonstrar, fortemente incorporadas em outros lugares (...) daquilo que chamamos de corpus platônico. Assim, a partir desta condição fragmentária, inerente ao próprio texto, e através dela mesma, a presente dissertação visa propor um senso de unidade ao diálogo. Para cumprir tal intento, defende-se que a estrutura do diálogo repousa em três características centrais, sendo estas responsáveis por qualificar o belo em si, são elas: a ordem (kalós é identificado com o kósmos, a ordem, à medida em que estabelece um principio estético de organização, garantindo a ordem harmônica dos seres); a admiração (isto é, o objeto perseguido tem uma validade permanente e universal de estima e, neste sentido, aparece conectado àquilo que é genuinamente bom (agathós), embora a ele não se limite); e, por fim, o comum (kalós é identificado com o koinós, o comum, pois é apresentado como aquilo que é compartilhado pelas coisas belas). A partir destas atribuições, espera-se alcançar uma designação apropriada do belo, de modo a conferir uma certa dignidade e prestígio a um diálogo pouco abordado nos estudos platônicos. (shrink)

This paper presents reasons against semantic relativism. Semantic relativism is motivated by intuitions that are presumed to raise problems for traditional or contextualist semantics in contested domains of discourse. Intuition-based arguments are those based on competent speakers’ putative intuitions about seeming faultless disagreement, eavesdropper, and retraction cases. I will organize the discussion in three parts. First, I shall provide a brief introduction to the intuition-based arguments offered in favor of semantic relativism. Second, I shall indicate that there are ways for (...) contextualism to explain the (appearance of) intuitions that support semantic relativism. Third, I shall review some experimental results and independent arguments that put into question the appeal of semantic relativism. (shrink)

I suggest that the main aim Recanati proposes to achieve in Perspectival Though—that a moderate relativist should adopt a Kaplanian framework with three levels of content, rather than a Lewisian framework with only two— seems insufficiently motivated, and the arguments offered do not settle the issue. I suggest furthermore that the claim that subjects’ mental states and cognitive situations can determine parameters or indices in circumstances of evaluation is an original and very interesting contribution. It is also an important one, (...) since it sets further apart the radical from the moderate relativist, and it is relevant in the current relativism debate, where truth is deemed to be relative to parameters other than worlds, times, places and individuals. I also offer a few objections to some of the reasons Recanati puts forward in support of this latter claim; I object in particular to those that depend on some considerations about psychological modes. (shrink)

This paper discusses and criticizes Segal’s 1989 argument against singular object-dependent thoughts. His argument aims at showing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. My criticism of Segal’s argument has two parts. First, I appeal to common anti-individualist arguments to the effect that Segal’s type of argument only succeeds in establishing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant for those aspects of subjects’ behaviour that do not require reference to external objects. Secondly, Segal’s view on singular thoughts is at odds with his (...) view on the semantics of proper names, which favours the singularity and object-dependency of the truth-conditions of sentences in which they occur. In particular, his views are at odds with a position he holds, that truth-conditional semantics can adequately account for all aspects of speakers’ linguistic competence in the use of proper names. (shrink)

Many authors agree that there is a dimension of conflict expressed through discourse that eludes purely semantic approaches. How and why do conative attitudes conflict? The latter question is the object of this paper. Conflicts of attitudes are typically modelled on one of two models. The first imposes a Subjective Rationality constraint on conflicting attitudes, and the second depends on the impossibility of Joint Satisfaction. This paper assesses whether either of the two conditions can account for conflicting attitudes. First, it (...) argues that Subjective Rationality cannot account for intersubjective conflicts. Second, it presents putative counterexamples to Joint Satisfaction. The counterexamples arise on the assumption that the attitudes are first personal. The paper then explores two alternatives: nihilism about attitudinal conflicts, and dropping the assumption that the relevant attitudes are first-personal states. Embracing nihilism would be devastating for expressivists and other non-cognitivists. But dropping the assumption on which the counterexamples to Satisfaction depend requires a new account of the conative attitudes expressed in value discourse. The paper concludes by pointing to an alternative. (shrink)

É relativamente recente a perspectiva revisionista dos intentos filosóficos de Platão. Apesar disso, a ideia de um filósofo preocupado apenas em construir um edifício sistemático e hermético tem se mostrado cada vez menos sustentável, principalmente quando se observam as diversas fontes que apontam para interesses que não se restringem à filosofia, bem como para o desenvolvimento dos aspectos dramáticos presentes no corpus platônico como um todo. A ideia de que a literatura tem uma influência na obra platônica parece clara e (...) um consenso entre os estudiosos, visto as inúmeras referências que Platão faz, por exemplo, à poesia épica nas figuras de Homero e Hesíodo. Mas pouco parece ter sido dito a respeito do inverso: da influência que Platão poderia ter exercido na literatura posterior. Visando lidar com esse obscurecimento, o presente estudo tem como intento primordial identificar e analisar a possível existência de elementos platônicos em dois romances do período imperial grego, a saber, em Quéreas e Calírroe de Cáriton de Afrodísias e em Dáfnis e Cloé de Longo. Em seguida, intenta demonstrar de que modo Platão, ao exercer uma clara influência na literatura posterior, deixou atrás de si não somente o já reconhecido legado filosófico, mas contribuiu substancialmente para o desenvolvimento da atividade literária, efetuando uma síntese complexa entre filosofia e literatura, ao mesmo tempo em que nos leva a questionar a suposta rigidez inflexível que as distinguem. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é defender uma leitura “inclusiva” da Scala Amoris (210a-212b) presente no Banquete de Platão, na qual o amante, em sua ascensão, incorpora um número cada vez maior de objetos belos em sua esfera de preocupação erótica. Neste sentido, posiciono-me de forma contrária à leitura “exclusiva”, na qual tal ascensão implicaria o abandono do que fora anteriormente desejado.

In this chapter, I try to answer the above question, and another question that it presupposes: can philosophy of language help us navigate the political news cycle? A reader can be sceptical of a positive answer to the latter question; after all, citizens, political theorists, and journalists seem to be capable of following current politics and its coverage in the news, and there is no reason to think that philosophy of language in particular should be capable of helping people make (...) sense and respond to the news. I will illustrate the application of philosophy of language to three contrasting strategies of political propaganda: dogwhistles, meaning perversions, and bald-faced lies. I hope that these help us see that philosophy of language can be a good tool in diagnosing demagoguery, and in resisting it. (shrink)

Recent years have seen an upsurge of inflammatory speech around the world. Understanding the mechanisms that correlate speech with violence is a necessary step to explore the most effective forms of counterspeech. This paper starts with a review of the features of dangerous speech and ideology, as formulated by Jonathan Maynard and Susan Benesch. It then offers a conceptual framework to analyze some of the underlying linguistic mechanisms at play: derogatory language, code words, figleaves, and meaning perversions. It gives a (...) hypothesis for assessing the moral responsibility of interlocutors in dangerous speech situations. The last section applies this framework to a case of demagogic discourse. The framework offered explains how public discourse has harmed social relations and institutions, and is an obstacle to rational resolutions to the political situation. (shrink)

A ideia de que certas categorias, propriedades, eventos, ou factos, são construídos socialmente tem sido defendida nas ciências sociais e humanidades desde meados do século xx. Nas últimas décadas, vários filósofos da tradição analítica começaram a dedicar mais atenção à possibilidade de que haja tipos de coisas construídas socialmente. A ideia complementa outra ideia relativamente consensual hoje em dia: a de que existem tipos naturais, mas que nem tudo o que existe constitui um tipo natural. São particularmente interessantes os tipos (...) de coisas que parecem naturais, mas que se argumenta serem na realidade construídos socialmente. Nesta entrada, identifico o papel que as teses construtivistas têm no progresso social e político, distingo entre várias formas de construtivismo teoricamente interessantes – causal e constitutivo, e discuto três objecções à ideia do construtivismo factual. (shrink)

Argumento que as tentativas que têm sido feitas para tornar a suposição da existência de contra-exemplos ao princípio de bivalência compatível com os esquemas deflacionistas para a verdade fracassam.

A filosofia da linguagem dedica-se ao estudo da linguagem natural. Não se dedica ao estudo de línguas particulares, tal como o português, o castelhano ou o inglês, mas sim ao estudo filosófico de características gerais da linguagem e da nossa capacidade e proficiência linguística enquanto seres humanos. A investigação do desenvolvimento da linguagem é uma tarefa a ser desenvolvida pela ciência – a paleontologia, a neurologia, etc. Mas a ciência ocupa-se de algo de que temos um conhecimento intuitivo prévio – (...) a linguagem natural. Ora, a filosofia da linguagem dedica-se em parte a tornar explícito o nosso conhecimento implícito da linguagem. Como tal, a filosofia da linguagem é uma disciplina central na filosofia. Este capítulo é uma introdução selectiva à filosofia da linguagem. A alternativa que se nos deparava era fazer uma breve apresentação de teorias do significado, da referência e da verdade, e ainda de alguns tópicos de pragmática, ou escolher um tópico em particular que é, tradicionalmente, o elegido nos cursos introdutórios à filosofia da linguagem. Este capítulo oferece assim uma introdução a alguns dos temas centrais e clássicos da filosofia da linguagem contemporânea. A maior parte do capítulo dedicar-se-á a teorias da referência, a de Frege e de Russell, e à sua crítica subsequente por filósofos como Saul Kripke. Isto poderia levar-nos a pensar que a filosofia da linguagem contemporânea continua, como era tradicional, focada simplificada da relação entre linguagem, mente e mundo. Nada podia estar mais longe da verdade, como se tornará claro. A grande alteração na perspectiva sobre o estudo da linguagem, que se deve a pessoas como Frege ou Russell, é que graças ao seu trabalho os filósofos passaram a reflectir sobre a contribuição semântica sistematicamente feita por diferentes categorias sintácticas nas diferentes construções frásicas em que possam ocorrer, por exemplo a de termos referenciais como os nomes próprios. A relação linguagem-mente-mundo continua a ser uma preocupação dos filósofos contemporâneos, mas de uma forma muito mais sofisticada, rigorosa e sistemática. Os filósofos preocupam-se agora, por exemplo, com as condições de verdade correctas de usos particulares de frases, com os estados de coisas reais ou possíveis que confeririam verdade ou falsidade às frases usadas, e com o valor cognitivo de distintos tipos de frases. Como indicaremos na última secção do capítulo, outros desenvolvimentos da filosofia da linguagem contemporânea dizem respeito àquilo que nós, enquanto seres humanos, conseguimos fazer por meio da linguagem, aos diferentes actos de fala possíveis, e aos diferentes níveis de significado que podemos comunicar por meio do uso de frases com um significado convencionalmente estabelecido. (shrink)

Dworkin’s famous argument from legal disagreements poses a problem for legal positivism by undermining the idea that the law can be (just) the result of the practice and attitudes of norm-applying officials. In recent work, the chapter author argued that a hybrid contextualist theory paired with a dispositional theory of value—a hybrid dispositionalism, for short—offers the resources to respond to similar disagreement- based arguments in other evaluative and normative domains. This chapter claims that the theory the author advocates can extend (...) to legal statements and disputes, and shares some important features with Toh’s (2011) idea that legal statements express shared acceptance of norms. The chapter proposes that a contextualist semantics for legal statements paired with the pragmatic communication of implicatures that express shared acceptances of norms, achieves the same goal that Toh aims at. (shrink)

Os nomes próprios são termos singulares que intuitivamente indicam os objectos do discurso ou pensamento. Alguns nomes falham na sua função de referir, sem que, aparentemente, deixem de desempenhar um papel representacional. Isso é paradoxal: Por um lado, os objectos referidos deveriam fazer parte de uma caracterização correcta dos nomes próprios. Por outro lado, o significado das frases que incorporam nomes vácuos sugere que tais objectos são extrínsecos aos pensamentos transmitidos. Isto é o problema que se levanta com a existência (...) de representações vácuas. Este artigo apresentará o problema pela perspectiva dada pelo estado da arte corrente. (shrink)

(...) . (shrink)

In the Critique of the Power of Judgement, Kant claims that ‘the English taste in gardens or the baroque taste in furniture pushes the freedom of the imagination almost to the point of the grotesque’ (KU 5:242). This paper attempts to reconstruct Kant’s views on the grotesque as a theoretical foundation for the modern conception of the grotesque as a negative aesthetic category. The first section of the paper considers and ultimately rejects the interpretation of the grotesque as a difficult (...) kind of beauty. The second section contrasts the experience of the grotesque with similar experiences of sublimity and dreams. The third section examines the discord between faculties underlying the experience of the grotesque, defining the grotesque as a subclass of ugliness and addressing potential objections to its inclusion in Kant’s aesthetics. The fourth and final section briefly discusses the specificity of the grotesque as a subclass of ugliness. (shrink)

É muitas vezes aceite que certas categorias, tipicamente as de género, raça, orientação sexual ou doença mental, são construções sociais e não divisões naturais no mundo. A distinção entre categorias naturais e categorias sociais, como pretende ser a distinção entre o sexo e o género, tem servido no âmbito da crítica e ciência social para advogar a abolição de certas normas sociais, e para a implementação de políticas mais equitativas. Contudo, há aspectos centrais do construtivismo que são pouco claros. O (...) que é que se nega ao rejeitar que as categorias construídas socialmente são naturais? E o que significa dizer que essas categorias são construções sociais? E será de todo verdade que certas categorias, como o género, são sociais e não naturais? Não tenho a pretensão de responder a todas estas complexas questões neste artigo, mas espero pelo menos iluminar parte do debate contemporâneo sobre estes problemas. Por uma questão de espaço, concentrar-me-ei na noção de género. (shrink)

This article has one aim, to reject the claim that negation is semantically ambiguous. The first section presents the putative incompatibility between truth-value gaps and the truth-schema; the second section presents the motivation for the ambiguity thesis; the third section summarizes arguments against the claim that natural language negation is semantically ambiguous; and the fourth section indicates the problems of an introduction of two distinct negation operators in natural language.

Discordamos sobre todo o tipo de coisas: o que existe, como as coisas funcionam, o que fazer, de que gostamos, etc. Entre os vários tipos de desacordo discutidos em debates filosóficos contemporâneos encontram-se os desacordos irrepreensíveis, os desacordos meramente verbais, e os desacordos entre pares. Os diferentes tipos de desacordo dão lugar a diversos problemas filosóficos. Há filósofos defendem que se o desacordo sobre uma questão é irrepreensível, então talvez não haja verdades objectivas sobre essa questão, e que se um (...) desacordo é meramente verbal, então não existe nenhum problema real em discussão. Algumas consequências destes tipos de desacordo concernem a objectividade dos problemas em causa. Outras consequèncias concernem a racionalidade das nossas crenças, como quando aprendemos que um par epistémico não concorda connosco. Este artigo resume a discussão filosófica contemporânea sobre o desacordo meramente verbal, o desacordo irrepreensível, e o desacordo entre pares. (shrink)

Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s metaphysics dissolves the necessary relationship between immateriality, immortality and thought. While in her youth this leads her to admit the possibility of thinking matter, in her mature work, it allows her to conceive space as non-thinking immaterial substance that links non-thinking material substance and thinking immaterial substance. To ground this conception of space, she draws on the thesis of the great chain of being. However, the possibility of thinking matter is not consistent with the hierarchy of beings, (...) because within this frame matter occupies the lowest place. My aim is to evaluate whether there is any alternative within Trotter's philosophy to solve this contradiction. -/- La metafísica de Catharine Trotter Cockburn disuelve la relación necesaria entre inmaterialidad, inmortalidad y pensamiento. Mientras que en su juventud esto la lleva a admitir la posibilidad de la materia pensante, en su madurez le permite concebir al espacio como sustancia inmaterial no pensante que oficia como eslabón entre la sustancia material no pensante y la sustancia inmaterial pensante. Para ello, apela también a la tesis de la gran cadena del ser. Sin embargo, la posibilidad de la materia pensante no es consistente con la tesis de la jerarquía de seres, porque en ella la materia ocupa el lugar más bajo. Me propongo estudiar si existe alguna alternativa dentro de la filosofía de Trotter que permita resolver esta contradicción. (shrink)

We argue that political propaganda is a negative phenomenon, against a recent strain of philosophical theorizing that argues that political propaganda can sometimes be neutral or even positive. After an exploration of the sense and connotation of the word ‘propaganda’ in ordinary use and in the scholarly literature, we discuss Ross’s (2002) account of propaganda as an epistemically defective form of political communication. We claim that, with some refinements, it is an explanatorily useful analysis. We then assess two prominent attempts (...) that aim at classifying legitimate cases of public communication as cases of propaganda, namely Ross’s (2013) revision of her previous model, and Stanley’s (2015) influential account. We show that some of the cases in contention are problematic and that the arguments the authors offer for classifying other non-problematic cases as propaganda are inconclusive. We also argue that the idea of considering legitimate public communication as propaganda is unmotivated. (shrink)

Our main objective is to locate and analyze some philosophical issues about the concept of mental illness and the manner it is used, especially in contemporary psychiatry. It is even difficult to find a standard meaning in the main psychiatric textbooks; and, when there is some exposition of the concept, it is sparse, uncritical and vague. As an immediate consequence of these issues, practical guidelines and protocols for the clinic arise, which become almost “automatic”, unreflective behaviors, practices translated as health (...) interventions and public mental health policies. An example is the problem of overdiagnosis, in which the use of medical technology (categories, drugs, clinical exams, etc.) has generated more harm and risks to the subject's health than benefits. Exposing these issues from a philosophical perspective can eventually contribute to the field of mental health. For this work, the main manuals and textbooks of psychiatry were selected to analyze how they deal with the concept of mental illness or disorder, in addition to locating the present discussion in authors from both philosophy and the psychiatric field and how they contribute to its clarification. (shrink)

Rescue workers have a stressful and risky occupation where being engaged is crucial to face physical and emotional risks in order to help other persons. This study aims to estimate work engagement levels of rescue workers (namely comparing nurses, firefighters, and police officers) and to assess the validity evidence related to the internal structure of the Portuguese versions of the UWES-17 and UWES-9, namely, dimensionality, measurement invariance between occupational groups, and reliability of the scores. To evaluate the dimensionality, we compared (...) the fit of the three-factor model with the fit of a second-order model. A Portuguese version of the instrument was applied to a convenience sample of 3,887 rescue workers (50% nurses, 39% firefighters, and 11% police officers). Work engagement levels were moderate to high, with firefighters being the highest and nurses being the lowest engaged. Psychometric properties were evaluated in the three-factor original structure revealing acceptable fit to the data in the UWES-17, although the UWES-9 had better psychometric properties. Given the observed statistically significant correlations between the three original factors, we proposed a 2nd hierarchal structure that we named work engagement. The UWES-9 first-order model obtained full uniqueness measurement invariance, and the second-order model obtained partial (metric) second-order invariance. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to compare and contrast the influential notion of natural and property rights created by John Locke in his "Second Treatise on Government" (1689) to the posterior notion of abstract right expressed by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in his "Elements of the Philosophy of Right". Said analysis is particularly pertinent given the complexity of Hegel’s political philosophy, and, perhaps more importantly, seeing as Hegel’s abstract right was (allegedly and in part) intended to point out the (...) shortcomings of Locke’s theory of natural and property rights, in order to further the human understanding of the world. More specifically, this article will examine the two rights theories in terms of their respective amounts of emphasis on individualism, or lack thereof. It will reveal three areas in which Lockean rights are more geared towards the primacy of the individual than Hegelian rights: (1) in their respective understandings of what it means to be a person, (2) in their conduciveness to individual wellbeing through the obligations each theory entails, and (3) in the extent of the rights themselves in relation to the state. (shrink)

A Crítica de Hume ao Argumento do Desígnio José Oscar de Almeida Marques Dep. de Filosofia – UNICAMP -/- RESUMO: É comum considerar que o chamado “argumento do desígnio” (o argumento a posteriori para provar a existência de Deus a partir da ordem e funcionalidade do mundo) teria sido refutado ou seriamente abalado por Hume. Mas a natureza e o alcance dessa alegada refutação são problemáticos, pois Hume muitas vezes expressou suas críticas através de seus personagens e evitou assumi-las (...) diretamente enquanto autor. Em vez de supor que Hume procedeu dessa forma apenas para disfarçar suas verdadeiras convicções e evitar um conflito com as autoridades eclesiásticas, proponho que sua posição nesse assunto não é tão categórica como às vezes se supõe, e que os famosos argumentos de Filo nos Diálogos mostram apenas que é possível que a ordem e funcionalidade do mundo tenham surgido sem a intervenção de um desígnio consciente, mas não podem por si sós dar a essa hipótese o mínimo grau de plausibilidade necessário para torná-la digna de uma séria consideração. De fato, antes da revolução explicativa operada por Darwin um século depois, ninguém estava realmente em condições de vislumbrar uma alternativa plausível à atuação de algum tipo de inteligência na geração da ordem e funcionalidade do mundo. ------------ Some Remarks on Hume’s Critique of the Argument from Design José Oscar of Almeida Marques Dep. of Philosophy - UNICAMP -/- ABSTRACT: The so-called “argument from design” (the a posteriori argument to prove the existence of God from the order and functionality of the world) is commonly considered to have been refuted or seriously impaired by Hume. But the nature and scope of this alleged refutation is problematic because Hume often expressed his critics through other characters’ mouth and avoided to assume them directly as author. Contrarily to the supposition that Hume proceeded in this way only to disguise his true convictions and to avoid a confrontation with the ecclesiastical authorities, I propose that his stance on the matter is not, in fact, as clear-cut as it is sometimes supposed, and that Philo’s famous arguments in the Dialogues show only that it is possible for the order and functionality of the world to have arisen without the intervention of an intelligent design, but cannot by themselves lend to this hypothesis the least degree of plausibility needed to make it worthy of serious consideration. In fact, before the explanatory revolution inaugurated by Darwin a century later, nobody was in position to envisage a plausible alternative to the operation of some sort or other of intelligence in the generation of the order and functionality of the world. (shrink)

This dissertation critically examines the writings of Max Stirner, especially his masterpiece The Ego and Its Own, as a discourse of resistance against modern forms of domination and, in particular, against the modern political State. I begin by examining Stirner's inversion of the Hegelian concept of the State, from the “actualization of freedom”to an instance of domination. The State appears, to Stirner as to Hegel, as the guardian of order and cohesion in modern societies. While both recognize the genesis of (...) sovereign power as violent, Hegel sustains that, with the progress of civilization, force is eradicated from the public order and private interests and common interest are reconciled. Stirner, on the contrary, insists that force is the other face of right, as the hidden pillar of the norm, which only reveals itself in moments of crisis. Stirner’s focus on the extreme case, largely anticipated and devalued by Hegel as unilateral and equivocal, seems to be anchored on the conviction that conflict is ineradicable, that between my own will and the (political, social) representation of that will there is always a gap, which cannot be filled by any collective arrangement. From this follows that, if conflict is scarcely manifest in modern societies, it is not because it was truly solved, but because it is effectively masked, due to the dissymmetry of power and the internalization of authority. The “unique one” appears, in this environment of great suspicion, as the one who cannot be represented, who surpasses every representation, threatening the authority of every representative. Accordingly, the “unique one” reclaims his own power, without allowing the satisfaction of his will to be mediated by obedience to collective institutions, affirming himself instead as sovereign over himself. Stirner suggests that the self-affirmation of the “unique one” inevitably leads to confrontation with the external powers that organize his existence. Stirner, nonetheless, chooses to think this confrontation in terms of a “revolt”, of a reflexive and individual act by which the individual emerges from the situation in which he finds himself, rather than as a “revolution”, a political or social act directed towards the systemic transformation of the status quo. Even if we admit the validity of the Stirnerian critique of the legitimizing discourses of modernity, the problem remains if this critique can be sustained on the “unique one”, “a thoughtless word”, an openly self-contradictory and self-destructive name, subject or principle (?). The possibility of founding a discourse of resistance on the egoism of Max Stirner seems to depend upon the answer that we choose to give to two intimately connected questions: what remains after the destructive vortex of the “unique one” that may sustain the resistance against a state that Max Stirner deems oppressive? Can this resistance be realized in the revolt of a unique one without the recognition of another one with whom to build the conditions of freedom? (shrink)